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As Christian fundamentalists we believe that basically Chris-
tianity is not a philosophical system nor a rational ae._ol()getic. 
We believe that Christianity is a factual revelation of God to 
man through His Son Jesus Christ for the purpose of redeeming 
man and bringing him back into fellowship with God. Without 
this factual relationship between man and God the complete 
Christian system would degenerate into a meaningless f_9rmalism, ' 
verbalism and, legalism. 
For this reason all rationalizations, philosophising and the 
construction of apologetic systems necessarily have to be secondary 
and subordinated to the factual implications of the situation. As 
Thomas a Kempis correctly observed : "Better surely, is an hum-
ble rustic that serveth God, than a proud philosopher that, neg-
lecting himself, studieth the course of the heavens," and again, 
"I had rather feel contr;ition than know the definition thereof." 
Here we may have one of the basic differences between Chris-
tianity and Greek philosophy, especially of the Platonic type, 
which defined reality in terms of "idea" and the soul in terms of 
continuity of thought, all amounting to a glorification of reason. 
The Christian, in defining God, proclaimed to the world GOD IS 
LOVE, and without having to go to extremes of holding that 
thought is a falsification of being or entirely separated from it, 
we may have to admit that pure thought by itself lacks some 
essential element as found in this Christian definition of reality. 
But though in fundamental Christianity pure reason is sub-
ordinated to faith and revelation, faith becomes more and more 
involved in reason as it tries to understand itself. St. Augustine 
defined theology as "Faith trying to understand itself," and be-
yond this the function of reason becomes that of an attempt to 
gain an ordered, coherent account of existence as a whole. 
Some professing Christians, realizing that the essential as-
pect of Christianity is not to be found in rationalizations, have 
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mistakenly assumed that these have no value whatsoever, and 
have been satisfied with either dogmatic authority, subjective 
experience or plain "common sense." But there is no good reason 
to suppose that common sense consisting of unreflective or un-
critical thinking is sounder or more profound than the -views 
which are the outcome of strenuous intellectual labor. And that 
this assumption often results in misconceptions is equally ap-
parent. Thus, in the name of common sense one may easily con- • 
fuse the apparent with the real. As Casserly aptly comments: 
"Some Christians confuse a certain kind of temperament with 
spirituality. Some fear a supposedly cold, theoretical temperament 
at the same time forgetting that other types are subject to their 
own dangers: the practical man to superficiality and self-satisfac-
tion, the emotional man to spiritual crudity and religious in-
stability." 
" Bernard Ramm in his "Types of Apologetic Systems" car-
. rectly objerves that since the function of Christian apologetics is 
to mediate intellectual tensions as they arise, to an extent all 
apologies are outmoded by the passage of time. Thus it would 
have been impossible to construct an effective Christian apolo-
getic say around 1800 A.O. which would include in its system 
the geocentric theory of the universe. It may be equally ineffective, 
as we shall shortly see, to construct a contemporary apologetic 
based on old-fashioned, a priori rationalism which ignores Kant 
and his impact on the main development of modern thought. 
The thought development of western civilization exhibits 
certain general trends. Fram Greeks to modern times, there has 
been a general shift in emphasis from primitive theories of reality 
to an examination of conditions under which knowledge is pos-
sible, from ontology to epistemology, from substance to function. 
As a result of this shift certain viewpoints have crystallized which 
to a great extent dominate modern thought today. 
Especially since the time of Kant, the modern thinker has 
found it difficult to maintain strict ontological viewpoints. The 
strong ·· contemporary emphasis on naturalism, positivism and 
. pragmatism has resulted in an agnostic or sceptical attitude to-
wards metaphysics in general or has dismissed the problem as 
"meaningless," even though the slightest reflection would indi-
cate that ex;stence, even in terms of the slightest organization, 
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would neces~arily imply some basic meaning, no matter how 
trivial, and to deny existence itself is patently impossible. 
The modern thinker has also failed to see, that in order to 
"dear the deck" he not only has to throw overboard all a priori 
ontological speculations, but also all a priori notions as to which 
epistemology is the valid one in the search for metaphysical truth. 
For "truth" is by his own admission still an unknown entity 
and may require a totally different epistemology than the one which 
he claims has sole va!Idity, namely empirical sense-experience. 
The Christian also claims a methodology. It may be more per-
sonal, subjective and not subject to universal objective experi-
mentation as the empiricist would like it to be, but since the 
empiricist admits that his epistemology has not given him meta-
physical certitude, but has led him straight into scepticism, the 
least he could do would be to examine the claims of other epis-
temologies instead of forming a priori judgments concerning 
them, the very thing he denounces in his opponents. 
In general terms, the modern thinker of the secularist variety 
tries to avoid the mistake of finding true knowledge exclusively 
through reason (a priori) or just through sense-experience (a 
posteriori), but tends to regard these as combined functions in 
which reason, including deductive logic and mathematics, have 
only formal but no factual validity except when dealing with data 
as supplied by the senses in the form of intuitions. According to 
this viewpoint, pure reason apart from sensation is analytic, 
analyzing ideas without adding anything new to knowledge. Syn-
thetic statements however which do increase our knowledge, are 
a posteriori, derived from experience and rest on probability. 
Kant's attempt to demonstrate a ·priori synthetic knowledge has 
not. been successful and the issue still rests with attempts to improve 
on Hume. 
To construct a strong apologetic today one would have to 
take into account that, as far as modern thought is concerned, the 
methodology of pure reason was the first citadel to be attacked 
and to fall. Anselm's ontological argument is dismissed by modern 
logic by simply demonstrating the impossibility of deriving a syn-
thetic conclusion from an analytic premise. Empiricism, on the 
other hand, has survived only in terms of practical applicability, 
but has resulted in ontological scepticism. Resting on probability 
it has proven itself to be a blind alley to certitude. Now if pure, 
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a pnon reason can prove nothing beyond its own existence, is 
formal, non-factual, conditional or otherwise becomes lost in ab-
stractions (witness the Middle Ages), and if empiricism results 
in scepticism, it would be difficult to fit faith and revelation into 
either of these epistemological structures and still claim that one 
was meeting the basic arguments of the contemporary opponents 
of Christianity. There must be another method, another emphasis 
which would not only provide the Christian with his basic phiio-
sophical orientation but would also constitute his strongest de-
fense. 
While in non-philosophic language we could talk about this 
unique Christian feature in terms of "heart-faith" or "inner trans-
formation", from the standpoint of epistemology we would have to 
define this as the subjective element involving inner intuition. 
If it could be shown that this subjective element is a factual 
inner experience occurring with basic similar effects in thousands 
o.f p~ople,_ then i~ could pr~perly be .labelled · ~ubjec~~-empiri­
. o~~ subject to its own epistemological laws, and the objective 
"{sense) empiricist would have to test it in accordance with this 
its own epistemology or otherwise be discredited on the same 
grounds by which he usually tries to discredit his Christian oppon-
ents, namely on the grounds of forming invalid, a priori judgments. 
He would have to submit himself, heart, body and soul to the 
methodology prescribed by Christianity or otherwise have no logi-
cal argument against it. And if it could be shown that this sub-
jective element has something unique about it, something that 
· would differentiate it from general psychological experiences, then 
this would provide for the basic differentiation of Christians from 
non-Christians, one of the basic claims of Christianity. 
The attitude of theologians toward the subjective has varied 
from Tennant's outright denial of its value to Pascal's and Kierke-
gaard's nearly exclusive emphasis on it. Even St. Augustine, 
though a brilliant speculative philosopher in the Platonic tradi-
tion, existed primarily in terms of that marvelous inward trans-
formation, the love and intimate awareness of God in the depths 
of his soul. Other writers, such as Brightman and Carnell, have 
emphasized a coherence system -or systematic consistency and inter-
relationship within total experience. Though this emphasis has 
unifying value and satisfies the desire of the intellect for com-
pleteness, there are few systems which do not at least aim to be 
comprehensive and inclusive, in their own terms, of course. That 
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nevertheless they differ is due to some basic emphasis or ass.ump-
tion which provides the system with its particular orientation. It 
would seem more important to find the unique factor, the key to 
the system of Christianity, after which the coherence would 
naturally follow. Basically a system will be judged not so much on 
the more or less inclusive coherence, but as to whether some funda-
mental feature is self-evidently the correct gateway to truth. And 
if the system as a whole would be the strongest defense of Chris-
tianity, it wou_ld have to be the most inclusive synthesis yet de-
vised, in itself a glorification of man's reason. It is well known, 
however, that many of the most brilliant and learned thinkers of 
western civilization have generally not accepted Christianity in its 
fundamental meaning, undoubtedly because of their own co-
herence theories which they felt were more all-inclusive than 
that of the Christian. And if God would have desired for man to 
gain his basic knowledge concerning truth in this way, He could 
have easily arranged it by means of a Platonic gateway to heaven. 
Li fe often bears out the opposite: We find men like Job, who 
failing to receive a rational answer to the cry of his soul, "Why 
do the righteous suffer", nevertheless discovers that man can have 
peace without satisfying the intellect. Once the basic issue has 
been settled, a coherence is welcome but never decisive. It is also 
difficult to see how a primary emphasis on coherence would not 
tend to minimize the uniqueness of Christianity. 
As mentioned above, using epistemological terminology we 
would have to label the unique experimental aspect of Chris-
tianity as subjective intuition. For if there is no inward transforma- t)l 
tion, no inner ffeedom7noawareness of the nearness, the holiness 
of God, no victory after struggle, no peace and no love, then the 
claims of Christianity are false. Three propositions should make 
this clear: First, God is Love, and Love is not pure thought even 
though symbolized by a word. Second, the Holy Spirit is Power 
(Ye shall receive power after the Holy Ghost is come on you), 
and again, power and pure thought are not the same. Thirdly, 
the Peace of God is unique (My peace I give unto you, not as the 
world giveth, give I unto you). It is an inner experience of such 
type that cannot be derived in any way except through God. 
Again, the word "peace" is a symbol standing not for pure thought 
but for an inner, intuitive experience, and the verification of an 
intuition is the intuition itself, not some a priori category of logic. 
Rational thought here functions as a neutral field of symbols 
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which are used to represent and communicate ideas standing for 
intuitions derived from either the world of sense experience or 
from inner experience. 
And it will not do for the empiricist to dismiss the entire 
field of inner experience by labelling it "psychological" and as-
suming that this way he has explained away its factual potential, 
nor will it do for the theological rationalist to dismiss it as "in-
effable." To answer the empiricist, whether all inward experiences • 
are basically of the same type, or whether there be some exhibit-
ing a noetic quality differentiating them from pure psychological 
experience can be determined only a posteriori. Only a person 
who has actually experienced the love of God can decide whether 
it is in any way different from other types of psychological emo-
tions . . To answer the rationalist, to claim that any genuine reli-
gious experience is ineffable is to contradict both the Bible and 
experience. "My peace I leave unto you" can have no meaning 
unless we can know something about it, and thousands of prac-
ticing Christians would be willing to testify with St. Paul, "I 
know whom I have believed." And from the standpoint of pure 
scientific methodology, the subjective empiricist here is in no 
sense at a disadavantage, for the same inductive methods, at least, 
induction by analogy and explanatory induction (from effect to 
cause) would still be applicable. One would have to take into 
account, of course, the basic epistemological peculiarities of each 
field, and these would decide on the applicability of induction by 
simple enumeration. 
From methodological standpoint, it is not the isolated ex-
perience X alone which would stand up under inductive scrutiny, 
but the sequence Xl, X2, X3 ... which would provide us with 
a chain of occurences necessary for inductive probability and thus 
for this type of an apologetic. As far as the simple event is con-
cerned, the objective (sense) empiricist is not concerned with 
its ontological implications, taking the "common sense" viewpoint. 
A swan is "white" if it appears to be white. Taking also most 
inner experiences at face value, the subjective empiricist, however, 
would have the advantage of dealing with some containing a noetic 
quality, the only clue leading out of empirical scepticism. 
Granted that there are difficulties involved in analyzing inner 
experience, but on the one hand, the rationalist's and empiricist's 
metaphysical difficulties are infinitely greater, as the complete out-
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put of the philosophy of western civilization testifies, on the other 
hand, from a practical standpoint, we as Christians will be able 
to meet the demands of existence successfully only if there is a 
peace and love in our hearts which, as we know from bitter expe-
rience, can not be self-created. 
It_is certainly not self-evident as to whether the law of contra-
diction can be asserted independently of God or not. This point 
could be debated for the next hundred years. The important thing 
is that there is something we can know. Van Till writes: "It is 
only when the Holy Spirit gives a man a new heart that he will 
accept the evidence of scripture about itself and about nature for 
what it really is. It is true further that for the acceptance of that 
revelation it is again upon the testimony of the Spirit that we 
must depend." And Carnell: "That which enables a sinner to 
see God's word as true is the inward work of the Spirit." Is the 
inward work of the Spirit ineffable? If so, we know nothing about 
it. And yet both scripture and experience testify as to the reality 
of the Holy Spirit indwelling the transformed believer. 
We as Christian fundamentalists accept the Bible as the in-
spired Word of God. But also here the tendence to over-conceptu-
·alize factual reality has already shown its destructive tendency, 
resulting in a wishy-washy, backboneless and powerless type of 
Christianity. One of the basic trends in life is to gradually shift the 
emphasis from the end to the means, from the intangible to the 
tangible, from the spirit to the letter, from vital, transforming 
faith to faith as intellectual assent or pure thought, from the Bible 
as a pathway to God to the Bible as an object of devotion. While, 
in theory, heart-faith is preached, in practice the term "heart-faith" 
has often become a slogan requiring only intellectual assent. 
Men who have been powerfully us~d by God have always 
realized this danger. Andrew Murray writes: "His Word, which 
is meant to point us away to God, may actually intervene and hide 
Him from us. The mind may be occupied and interested and de-
lighted in what it finds, but if it does not lead us to wait on God, 
to glorify Him, to receive His grace and power for sweetening 
and sanctifying our lives, it becomes a hindrance instead of a 
help." 
And Luther, whose doctrine of faith has been so often mis-
interpreted by his followers, writes (Preface to St. Paul's Epistle 
to the Romans): "Faith is not the human fancy and dream which 
7 
some people mistake for faith. When such persons see that no 
amendment of the life and no good works follow, although they 
may hear and talk much about faith, they fall into error and de-
clare that faith is not enough, but we must perform good works if 
we would be pious and attain salvation. In consequence of this, 
when they hear the Gospel, they fall to work and frame for them-
selves by their own powers a notion in their hearts which says, 
"I believe." This they then consider true faith. But as it is a human 
invention and notion, of which the heart in its depths finds out 
nothing, it accomplishes also nothing and no amendment of the 
'\'J life follows. But faith i~ a divii:ie work in us, which transforr~s 
\I\ us anew from God, which eruct.fies the old Adam, makes us 10 
heart, temper, disposition, and in all our powers entirely different 
men, and brings with it the Holy Spirit. 0, this faith is a living, 
busy, active, powerful thing. It is impossible that it should not be 
ceaselessly doing that which is good. But he who does not do such 
works, is a man without faith. He gropes and casts about him to 
find faith and good works, not knowing what either is, and yet 
prattles and idly multiplies words about faith and good works." 
An explication of the term "faith", so that it would become mean-
ingful to modern man, is thus of ~rucial importance. 
The basic and necessary starting point is a factual relation-
ship between man and God by means of a vital faith which would 
)( involve a transformation of the total field of consciousness, includ-
ing volition. As Berdyaev puts it: "God must again be the centre of 
our whole life, our thoughts, our feelings, our only dream, our 
only desire, our only hope." Man can live only by faith, either in 
God or in idols. But if faith is not a living, transforrping vital 
part of his being, then it itself becomes an idol, irrespective of 
how its meaning is defined. What we need more than anything 
~ else is a powerful indwelling of the Holy Spirit. 
"If I know all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have 
all faith, but have not love, I am nothing." 
ST. PAUL. 
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